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Abstract. We study the effect of distortionary taxes on three types of market structure: 
Cournot duopoly, Stackelberg duopoly, anda monopoly under a collusive agreement 
between the two rival firms in the industry. We investigate different tax regimes such as a 
per unit tax, an ad valorem tax and a tax on total revenue. A unit tax rate reduces 
optimaloutput and profits for firms while market price rises with the imposition of the 
tax.Interestingly, the optimal tax rate is the same for all three market structures. The ad 
valorem tax is imposed on the value of the product and is mostly borne by the Stackelberg 
follower who ends up producing a greater output than what he would produce in the 
absence of a tax. The ad valorem tax increases firm output and reduces market price. The 
total revenue decreases output and increases industry price like the unit tax. 
Keywords. Cournot duopoly, Stackelberg game, optimal tax rate, Lerner index. 
JEL. D42, D43, H21, L12, L13. 
 
1. Introduction 
n the standard Cournot model two identical firms compete on 
quantities and choose their optimal output levels simultaneously. 
Cournot (1838) constructed profit functions and used partial 
differentiation to come up with the firm’s best “reaction function” for given 
output levels of the other firm. The intersection of the two reaction 
functions results in a stable equilibrium. Stackelberg (1934) came up with a 
hierarchical model. There is a leader who makes the first move and a 
follower who takes the residual market demand. The leader has a crucial 
advantage in that he chooses a quantity that maximizes his payoff, by 
anticipating the follower’s reaction. By using backward induction in this 
sequential game, Stackelberg (1934) first found the reaction function of the 
follower, which is a function of the output level of the leader. Then he used 
it to calculate the reaction function of the leader. 
Some previous studies discuss market structure in relation to taxation. 
Haworth (1998) examines the effect of a specific and ad valorem tax on firm 
market share in a duopoly where firms have different costs. Haworth 
(1998) relates tax to cost efficiency and finds that specific and ad valorem 
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commodity taxation increases the market share of the lower-cost firm, 
while decreasing that of the higher-cost firm. Anderson et al. (2001) present 
a similar analysis showing that ad valorem taxes are more efficient than 
unit taxes in the short run with symmetric costs across firms. Delipalla & 
Keen (1992) demonstrate that ad valorem taxes have welfare advantages 
over unit taxes for symmetric Cournot-Nash oligopolies. Skeath & Trandel 
(1994) demonstrate that in the case of monopoly ad valorem tax yields 
higher consumer surplus, profits and tax revenue. Anderson et al. (2001) 
contrast the Cournot model of homogeneous products with Bertrand 
competition of differentiated products and find that unit tax is more 
efficient under Bertrand competition. Anderson et al. (2001) find that in the 
Cournot model where products are homogeneous asymmetric cost 
structures support ad valorem taxes. However, with differentiated 
products, unit tax may be preferable.In a strategic market game Grazzini 
(2006) demonstrates that per unit taxation is welfare superior to ad valorem 
tax if the number of consumers is sufficiently high compared to the number 
of oligopolists. Opposite to Colombo & Labrecciosa (2013), Azacis & Collie 
(2018) show that the choice of tax does not matter in Cournot oligopoly 
with homogeneous products and general demand functions. Azacis & 
Collie (2018) also find that tax revenue is always higher with an ad valorem 
tax than with a specific one. 
Some more general studies involve Stern (1987) and Besley (1989) who 
demonstrate how commodity taxation affects prices, output and profits in 
imperfectly competitive industries. More specifically, Stern analyses the 
effect of specific and ad valorem taxation on oligopolistic and 
monopolistically competitive markets. Schröder (2004) and Vetter (2013) 
discuss ad valorem and specific tax in the context of monopolistic 
competition. 
Our study is standard in that we investigate a linear demand curve and 
a market shared by two firms with identical, constant marginal cost. In this 
sense, we use a very simple framework to demonstrate the effect of 
different types of tax on market structure. Furthermore, we analyze three 
types of tax, a per-unit tax, an ad valorem tax and a tax on total revenue. 
Ad valorem taxes are imposed on the value of the good, while a specific tax 
is essentially levied on the units of the good produced by firms. Our 
findings are consistent with Haworth (1998) if marginal cost is assumed to 
be equal for the two firms. However, Howarth (1998) puts the discussion in 
the context of a simple oligopoly with no reference to other market 
structures. We analyze the duopolists under a cartel agreement and a 
Stackelberg sequential game in addition to Cournot. We compute the effect 
of these three types of tax on the three market structures in terms of firm 
output, profit and industry price. We investigate optimal tax rate for unit 
and ad valorem tax from the perspective of tax collection to the 
government since the government may have incentives to maintain a given 
market structure in order to maximize its tax revenue. We also compute the 
Lerner index of the three market structures under the three tax regimes, 
that is, a total of nine outcomes. 
Turkish Economic Review 
T.P. Todorova, & B. Vatoci, TER, 7(2), 2020, p.73-90. 
75 
75 
The paper has several sections. In section 2 we demonstrate the case 
without taxation. Section 3 presents the case of a unit tax. Section 4 covers 
the ad valorem tax as a tax on the value of the good. Section 5 reveals the 
effect of a tax on total revenue. The paper ends with conclusions. 
 
2. The case without taxation 
This initial case summarizes the output, price and profit level of each 
market structure in the absence of taxation. This case serves as a benchmark 
for the other cases when tax is levied. We follow the standard Cournot and 
Stackelberg setting where the Cournot outcome is the result of a 
simultaneous, one-stage game, while the Stackelberg one follows from a 
sequential, dynamic game. The Cournot case represents a symmetrical 
duopoly, while the Stackelberg duopoly is one of a leader and a follower. 
We also show a monopoly under a collusive agreement between the two 
rival firms in the industry. We assume that a homogenous product is 
produced and both firms have a constant marginal cost of production c. 
The market demand and the cost function of each firm are given as 
 
1 2( ) ( )p q a b q q     , 0a b   i iC cq  1,2i    (1) 
 
Using simple optimization, we find the reaction function of each of the 
two duopolists in the Cournot case. 
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and symmetrically for the second Cournot duopolist, 
 
1
2
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q
b
 

        (6) 
 
produces the following optimal quantities for the two identical Cournot 
duopolists, industry price and profits for the two firms. 
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In the case of monopoly, we have one seller since the two Cournot 
duopolists collusively agree to produce the monopoly output. 
 
( )q pq cq     ( )p q a bq       (10) 
2( ) ( )a bq c q a c q bq             (11) 
2 0
d
a c bq
dq

            (12) 
2
m
a c
q
b

 ,         (13) 
 
where each Cournot duopolist would ideally produce half of this output 
under collusion, that is, 
2 4
mq a c
b

 . Apparently, this output is lower than 
their output without collusion, i.e., 
1 2
3
C Ca cq q
b

  . Furthermore, with 
monopoly we obtain a higher price and industry profit.  
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Under Stackelberg the follower optimizes along his residual demand 
curve, given the output and behavior of the leader. 
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The profit of the leader is 
 
2
1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1( )a bq bq q cq aq bq bq q cq             (21) 
 
Substituting for 2q  in the profit function of the incumbent, 
2
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1
2
S a cq
b

          (24) 
 
gives the output of the leader, while that of the follower is 
 
2
4
S a cq
b

 , or,        (25) 
 
the leader produces twice as much as the follower in a Stackelberg 
sequential game. The total industry output exceeds that of the Cournot 
duopolists at 
1 2
3( )
4
S S a cq q
b

  . 
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2 4 4 4
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Profits are, respectively, 
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Figure 1. Cournot equilibrium versus Stackelberg 
 
Figure 1 illustrates how the equilibrium is shifted from the Cournot 
outcome to Stackelberg. Whereas two symmetrical oligopolists produce 
identical output 
3
a c
b

 at the crossing point of their reaction functions, in 
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the Stackelberg game the leader has a first-mover advantage and produces 
twice as much as the follower along his reaction function. 
 
3. The case of a per-unit tax 
If the government imposes a unit tax to the amount t, then total tax 
collection is T tq  where 1 2q q q   is cumulative industry output. A unit 
tax acts like an extra cost to the firm. In the Cournot case profit 
maximization gives the optimal output levels of the Cournot duopolists. 
 
1 1 1( ) ( )q p c t q            (29) 
2
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dq
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and identically for the second duopolist, 
 
2
2 1
2
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d
a c t bq bq
dq

            (32) 
 
gives the optimal output levels 
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3
C Ca c tq q
b
 
          (33) 
 
Furthermore, the industry price and firm profits with the unit tax are 
 
2 ( ) 2 2
3 3
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b a c t a c t
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b
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         (35) 
 
As could be expected, the output and profit levels of the two Cournot 
duopolists fall with the introduction of the unit tax with profits falling very 
quickly with a higher unit tax rate since the effect of the tax rate comes 
under a square. At the same time, the industry price increases with the 
imposition of the tax. A comparison of the results on quantity, price and 
profit confirms their validity – in the case of a zero tax the results are 
identical to those without a tax. Figure 2 shows the effect of the unit tax on 
the reaction functions of the two duopolists. The tax lowers the output 
levels of each Cournot duopolist and moves both reaction functions to the 
left. This results in a new equilibrium where both duopolists produce less 
at the optimum. 
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Figure 2. Effect of tax on the reaction functions of the Cournot duopolists 
 
Under a cartel agreement the tax will again act as an additional cost to 
the joint production of the firms. 
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Again, these results confirm the theory in the absence of a tax. The 
output, price and profit of the monopolist would be equal to those in the 
case of zero tax. The presence of the tax reduces the output and the profit, 
with profit being reduced much more significantly since the tax rate t  is in 
the square and carries a negative sign. This implies that increases in the tax 
rate by even small amounts provoke large decreases in the profit level of 
the cartel. Comparing the after-tax profits of the cartel with the joint profit 
of the Cournot duopolists, we obtain 
 
1 2
t C C
m    , since        (42) 
2 2( ) 2( )
4 9
a c t a c t
b b
   
        (43) 
 
Even with the imposition of a unit tax on quantity, the two Cournot 
duopolists are better off colluding.What would the effect of a unit tax be on 
the two duopolists under Stackelberg? 
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1 2( ) ( )p q a b q q     , 0a b   i iC cq  1,2i    (44) 
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The profit of the leader is 
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Substituting for 2q  in the profit function of the incumbent, 
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gives the output of the leader, while that of the follower is 
 
2
4
S a c tq
b
 
 , or,        (53) 
 
the leader produces twice as much as the follower in a Stackelberg game 
even with a unittax rate. To compute industry price, 
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While industry output decreases, industry price increases with tax. The 
profits of the incumbent and the entrant are, respectively, 
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The entrant receives half of the profit of the incumbent, as in the case 
without tax. The tax significantly decreases the profit to both players. We 
see that in comparison with Cournot Stackelberg has a higher output level, 
lower market price and lower industry profit, although the Stackelberg 
leader is still better off than the Cournot duopolist. This comes at the 
expense of the Stackelberg follower. Table 1 summarizes the results of 
optimal output, industry price and firm profit under the different market 
structures. The revenue to the government can be expressed in all three 
cases.  
 
Table 1. Output, price, profit and Lerner index under different tax regimes with Cournot, 
Stackelberg and collusion 
 Tax mode Firm output Industry price Firm profit Lerner index L 
 
 
 
Cournot 
no tax 
3
a c
b
  2
3
a c  
2( )
9
a c
b
  
2
a c
a c


 
unit tax 
3
a c t
b
   2 2
3
a c t 
 
2( )
9
a c t
b
   2
2 2
a c t
a c t
 
 
 
ad valorem tax 
3
a bt c
b
   2 2
3
a bt c   
2( ) (4 4 5 )
9
a c bt a bt c
b
     
2
2 2
a c bt
a c bt
 
 
 
revenue tax 
3 (1 )
a at c
b t
 

 2
3(1 )
a at c
t
 

 
2( )
9 (1 )
a at c
b t
 

 3
2
a at c tc
a at c
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Collusion 
no tax 
2
a c
b

 
2
a c
 
2( )
4
a c
b

 
a c
a c


 
unit tax 
2
a c t
b
   
2
a c t   
2( )
4
a c t
b
   
a c t
a c t
 
 
 
ad valorem tax 
2
a bt c
b
   
2
a bt c   2( ) (4 2 )
4
a c bt a bt c
b
     
a bt c
a bt c
 
 
 
revenue tax 
2 (1 )
a at c
b t
 

 
2(1 )
a at c
t
 

 
2( )
4 (1 )
a at c
b t
 

 2a at c tc
a at c
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stackelberg 
leader 
no tax 
2
a c
b
  3
4
a c  
2( )
8
a c
b
  
3
a c
a c


 
unit tax 
2
a c t
b
   3 3
4
a c t   
2( )
8
a c t
b
   
3
3 3
a c t
a c t
 
 
 
ad valorem tax 
2
a c
b

 
3 2
4
a c bt   
2( ) 4 ( )
8
a c bt a bt c
b
     
2
3 2
a c bt
a c bt
 
 
 
revenue tax 
2 (1 )
a at c
b t
 

 (1 ) 3
4(1 )
a t c
t
 

 
2( )
8 (1 )
a at c
b t
 

 (1 ) 4
(1 ) 3
a t c tc
a t c
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stackelberg 
follower 
no tax 
4
a c
b
  3
4
a c  
2( )
16
a c
b
  
3
a c
a c


 
unit tax 
4
a c t
b
   3 3
4
a c t   
2( )
16
a c t
b
   
3
3 3
a c t
a c t
 
 
 
ad valorem tax 2
4
a c bt
b
   3 2
4
a c bt 
 
2( ) 4 ( 3 )
16
a c bt a bt c
b
     2
3 2
a c bt
a c bt
 
 
 
revenue tax 
4 (1 )
a at c
b t
 

 (1 ) 3
4(1 )
a t c
t
 

 2( )
16 (1 )
a at c
b t
 

 2
3 2
a c bt
a c bt
 
 
 
 
In the Cournot case, 
 
2
1 2
2( ) 2( ) 2
( )
3 3
t a c t a c t t
T tq t q q
b b
   
         (57) 
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2( ) 4 0
dT
a c t
dt
           (58) 
*
2
a c
t

          (59) 
 
From the perspective of total tax collection in the Cournot case and tax 
revenue being maximized, the value of *t  gives optimal tax rate to the 
government. With monopoly, 
 
2( ) ( )
2 2
t
m
t a c t a c t t
T tq
b b
   
         (60) 
2 0
dT
a c t
dt
            (61) 
*
2
a c
t

          (62) 
 
To find optimal tax rate in Stackelberg, 
 
2
1 2
3 ( ) 3( )
( ) ( )
2 4 4 4
a c t a c t t a c t at ct t
T tq t q q t
b b b b
       
        (63) 
2 0
dT
a c t
dt
            (64) 
*
2
a c
t

          (65) 
 
We see that the same optimal tax rate on quantity obtains in all three 
cases, Cournot, collusion and Stackelberg. An explanation is that we have a 
tax based on the amount of output produced. Although the unit tax 
changes the total output levels in all cases, it does not change the output 
distribution between the duopolists. The Cournot duopolists are still 
producing symmetrical levels of output, and the leader is again producing 
twice as much the follower. Table 2 presents these optimal tax rates. 
 
Table 2. Optimal tax rate with a unit tax and an ad valorem tax 
 Market structure Optimal tax rate 
 
 
Unit tax 
Cournot 
2
a c  
Monopoly 
2
a c  
Stackelberg 
2
a c  
 
 
Ad valorem 
Cournot 2
4
a c
b
  
Monopoly 
2
a c
b
  
Stackelberg 3
4
a c
b
  
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4. The case of an ad valorem tax 
An ad valorem tax t is imposed on the value of the product. It would be 
imposed by governments when the value of the product is significant. The 
ad valorem tax acts like some quantity is taken away from the firm in the 
form of tax to the government. Thus, the profit to the firm becomes 
 
1 1 1 1( ) ( )q p q t cq       1 2p a bq bq     (66) 
 
Hence, the tax collected by the government is like a loss to the firm to 
the amount of pt . In the Cournot case, 
 
1 1 2 1 1( )( )a bq bq q t cq            (67) 
1
1 2 1
1
( ) 0
d
a bq bq b q t c
dq

            (68) 
1 22 0a bq bq bt c            (69) 
2
1
2
a bq bt c
q
b
  
 ,     (70) 
 
and symmetrically for the second Cournot duopolist, 
 
1
2
2
a bq bt c
q
b
  
         (71) 
 
produces equal optimal quantities for the Cournot duopolists 
 
1 2
3
C Ca bt cq q
b
 
   1 2
2( )
3
C C a bt cq q q
b
 
       (72) 
 
The Cournot industry price and profit levels are, respectively, 
 
2 ( ) 2 2
3 3
C
b a bt c a bt c
p a bq a
b
   
         (73) 
1 1 1
2
2
( 2 2 ) ( )
( ) ( )
3 3 3
( ) (4 4 5 )
9
a bt c a bt c a bt c
p q t cq t c
b b
a c bt a bt c
b


     
      
   
 
 (74) 
 
We notice that in the absence of an ad valorem tax the profit of each firm 
is equal to the previously obtained profit of each Cournot oligopolist. In the 
case of monopoly,the ad valorem tax gives the following results. 
 
( ) ( )q p q t cq      ( )p q a bq       (75) 
2( )( )a bq q t cq aq at bq bqt              (76) 
Turkish Economic Review 
T.P. Todorova, & B. Vatoci, TER, 7(2), 2020, p.73-90. 
84 
84 
2 0
d
a bq bt c
dq

            (77) 
2
m
a bt c
q
b
 
 ,        (78) 
( )
2 2
m
b a bt c a bt c
p a
b
   
   , and     (79) 
2 2
2
( ) ( ) ( ) 2 ( )
( )
2 2 2 4
( ) (4 2 )
4
m
a bt c a bt c c a bt c a bt c c a bt c
t
b b b
a c bt a bt c
b

          
    
   

          
(80) 
 
which under zero tax or 0t   gives the same profit as under monopoly. 
Under Stackelberg with an ad valorem tax the profit functions of the 
follower could be expressed as, 
 
2 2 2 2( ) ( )q p q t cq     1 2( ) ( )p q a b q q     , 0a b 
 i iC cq         (81) 
2 1 2 2 2( )( )a bq bq q t cq            (82) 
2
1 2
2
2 0
d
a bq bq bt c
dq

            (83) 
1
2
2
a bq bt c
q
b
  
 ,     (84) 
 
The profit of the leader, upon substitution for 2q , is 
 
1 1
1 1 2 1 1 1
( )( )
( )( )
2
a bq bt c q t
a bq bq q t cq cq
   
         (85) 
1 1 1
1
( )
0
2 2
d b q t a bq bt c
c
dq
    
          (86) 
1
2
S a cq
b

          (87) 
 
gives the output of the leader. The result is interesting in that the output of 
the Stackelberg leader is not dependent on the ad valorem tax and remains 
unchanged. For the follower, 
 
2
2
4
S a c btq
b
 
         (88) 
 
This result indicates that the ad valorem tax is mostly borne by the 
Stackelberg follower who ends up producing a greater output than what he 
would produce in the absence of a tax. Under the unit tax rate both 
competitors were found to produce an amount smaller than that 
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withouttax. This can be explained by the fact that the ad valorem tax is 
imposed on the value of the produce and not its volume. Both Stackelberg 
competitors would be affected negatively through price, which decreases 
due to the tax. 
 
1 2
( ) ( 2 ) 3 2
( )
2 4 4
S S b a c b a c bt a c btp a b q q a
b b
    
         (89) 
 
Profits are, respectively, 
 
1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2
( 3 2 ) ( 2 ) ( )
( )
4 2 2
( 2 ) 2 2 4 4 4 ( ) 4 ( )
8 8
a c bt a c bt c a c
p q t cq
b b
a bt c ac c bct ac c a c bt a bt c
b b

    
     
          
 
          (90) 
2 2 2
2
( 3 2 ) ( 2 ) ( 2 )
( )
4 4 4
( ) 4 ( 3 )
16
a c bt a c bt c a c bt
p q t cq
b b
a c bt a bt c
b

     
     
   

  (91) 
 
As in the case of unit tax, we can compute the optimal tax rate of an ad 
valorem tax which maximizes total tax collection to the government. We do 
this in all three situations, a Cournot duopoly, monopoly and 
Stackelberg.Since the revenues which the government receives are a 
deduction of the firms’ profits to the amount of pt , this gives the following 
results for the optimal ad valorem tax to the three types of market 
structure. 
 
2( 2 2 ) 2 2
3 3
C
a bt c t at bt ct
T p t
   
        (92) 
4 2 0
dT
a bt c
dt
            (93) 
* 2
4
a c
t
b

          (94) 
 
The value of 
*t  gives optimal tax rate of an ad valorem tax in the 
Cournot case. With monopoly, 
 
2( )
2 2
m
t a bt c at bt ct
T p t
b
   
         (95) 
2 0
dT
a bt c
dt
            (96) 
*
2
a c
t
b

          (97) 
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gives the same optimal tax rate under ad valorem tax in the case of 
monopoly. Finally, for the Stackelberg game we obtain 
 
2( 2 3 ) 2 3
4 4
S
t a bt c at bt ct
T p t
   
        (98) 
4 3 0
dT
a bt c
dt
            (99) 
* 3
4
a c
t
b

          (100) 
 
We find that the optimal tax rate of monopolyexceeds that of Cournot 
which is possibly the result of a higher value (price) under collusion. The 
optimal tax rate under Stackelberg also exceeds that of Cournot. Table 2 
summarizes these results. 
 
5. The case of a tax on total revenue 
The tax on the total revenue will be a percentage of the total revenue, 
that is, [0,1)t . When the government imposes a tax on revenue some of it 
is taken away from the firm such that 
 
1 1 1 1( ) (1 )q pq t cq     1 2( ) ( )p q a b q q     , 0a b 
 i iC cq         (101) 
2 2 2 2( ) (1 )q pq t cq           (102) 
1 1 2 1 1( ) (1 )a bq bq q t cq            (103) 
1
1 2
1
(1 )( 2 ) 0
d
t a bq bq c
dq

            (104) 
 
where under Cournot equilibrium the outputs of the two Cournot 
duopolists are equal, that is, for firm 1, 
 
1(1 )( 3 ) 0t a bq c           (105) 
13
1
c
a bq
t
 

        (106) 
1 2
3 (1 )
C Ca at cq q
b t
 
 

, and       (107) 
2
3(1 )
C
a at c
p
t
 


        (108) 
 
The profit of each duopolist is 
 
2
1 1 2
( ) 2 ( )
( ) ( )
3 (1 ) 3 9 (1 )
a at c a at c a at c
q p pt c c
b t b t
 
     
      
 
 (109) 
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A more thorough investigation shows that the tax on total revenue 
increases the output and reduces the industry price for the Cournot 
duopolists. With monopoly the tax on total revenue takes away an amount 
pqt  from the firm so that the profit becomes 
 
( ) (1 )q pq t cq      ( )p q a bq    , 0a b    (110) 
2( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )(1 )q a bq q t cq aq bq t cq             (111) 
(1 )( 2 ) 0
d
t a bq c
dq

            (112) 
2
1
c
a bq
t
 

        (113) 
2 (1 )
m
a at c
q
b t
 


, and        (114) 
2(1 ) 2(1 )
m
a at c a at c
p a
t t
   
  
 
      (115) 
 
The profit of the monopolist is 
 
2( )( ) ( ) ( )
(1 )
4 (1 ) 2 (1 ) 4 (1 )
m
a at c a at c c a at c a at c
pq t cq
b t b t b t

       
     
  
 (116) 
 
With Stackelberg the optimization problem for the incumbent and the 
entrant is 
 
1 1 1 1( ) (1 )q pq t cq     1 2( ) ( )p q a b q q     , 0a b 
 i iC cq         (117) 
2 2 2 2( ) (1 )q pq t cq           (118) 
2
2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2( ) (1 ) ( )(1 )a bq bq q t cq aq bq q bq t cq             (119) 
2
1 2
2
( 2 )(1 ) 0
d
a bq bq t c
dq

            (120) 
1 22
(1 )
c
a bq bq
t
  

       (121) 
1
2
( )(1 )
2 (1 )
S a bq t cq
b t
  


       (122) 
 
Substituting for 2q  in the profit function of the incumbent, 
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1
1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1
( )(1 )
( ) (1 ) (1 )
2(1 )
( )(1 )
(1 )
2 2(1 ) 2
( )(1 )
2 2
a bq t c
a bq bq q t cq a bq q t cq
t
a bq a bq t cc
q t cq q cq
t
a bq t q cq

   
           
 
     
            
 
 
          (123) 
 
which gives the optimal output for the incumbent 
 
1
1 1
1
( )(1 ) (1 ) 0
d
a bq t b t q c
dq

            (124) 
1(1 ) 2 (1 ) 0a t b t q c            (125) 
1
(1 )
2 (1 ) 2 (1 )
S a t c a at cq
b t b t
   
 
 
       (126) 
 
gives the output of the leader, while that of the follower is 
 
2
2 4 (1 ) 2 (1 ) 4 (1 )
S a a at c c a at cq
b b t b t b t
   
   
  
,     (127) 
 
that is, the leader again produces twice as much as the follower. For the 
industry price, 
 
1 2
(1 ) 3
( )
2(1 ) 4(1 ) 4(1 )
S S a at c a at c a t cp a b q q a
t t t
     
      
  
  (128) 
 
The profits of the incumbent and the entrant are, respectively, 
 
2
1 1 1 1
(1 ) 3 (1 ) ( )
4 4 2 (1 ) 8 (1 )
a t c a t c a at c
pq cq tq c
b t b t

      
             
 (129) 
2
2 2 2 2
(1 ) 3 (1 ) ( )
4 4 4 (1 ) 16 (1 )
a t c a t c a at c
pq cq tq c
b t b t

      
             
 (130) 
 
The entrant receives half of the profit of the incumbent, as in the case 
without tax. The tax significantly decreases the profit to both players. Table 
1 again presents these results. It also lists thevalues of the Lerner index we 
have computed for the respective market structures under the different tax 
regimes. In the absence of tax,we have m c SL L L  , that is, the degree of 
market power is highest with monopoly followed by Cournot and 
Stackelberg.In the case of the unit tax the market power of the Stackelberg 
firms is lowestbecause the entry of the follower reduces the price for the 
Stackelberg leader (it could be checked that m C Sp p p  ). 
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6. Conclusion 
In comparison with Cournot the Stackelberg duopoly has a bigger 
output, lower price, and lower industry profit. Although the Stackelberg 
leader has a higher profit than the Cournot duopolist, the Stackelberg 
follower is in a worse position. It is beneficial for Cournot duopolists to 
collude even with taxation. The unit tax and the tax on total revenue have a 
similar effect – in all market structures output and profit levels fall, while 
market price increases from the pre-tax level. With both types of tax, the 
Stackelberg leader produces twice as much as the follower and obtains 
twice his profit.We find that the optimal tax rate from the perspective of 
total tax collection for the unit tax is the same for the three markets. This 
could be because the tax is imposed on the amount produced. Although the 
unit tax changes the total output levels, it does not change the output 
distribution between the firms. 
The effect of the ad valorem tax is opposite to that of the other two types 
of taxes. The ad valorem tax increases the output levels of firms, while 
lowering the industry price. The result follows from the fact that the tax is 
imposed on the value of the product and not on the quantity. The output of 
the Stackelberg leader is unaffected by the ad valorem tax. The ad valorem 
tax is mostly borne by the Stackelberg follower who ends up producing 
more than before the imposition of the tax. Both the incumbent and the 
entrant are affected negatively through price, which decreases with the tax. 
The Lerner index is highest for the monopoly firm, followed by the 
Cournot duopolists. The market power of the firms in a Stackelberg game is 
lowest because the entry of the follower reduces the price for the 
Stackelberg leader. 
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